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Reflections;
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1 Reflections; or Sentences and Moral Maxims
Our virtues are most frequently but vices disguised. 
1.
What we term virtue is often but a mass of various actions and diverse interests, 
which fortune, or our own industry, manage to arrange; and it is not always from 
valour or from chastity that men are brave, and women chaste. 
2.
Self-love is the greatest of flatterers. 
3.
Whatever discoveries have been made in the region of self-love, there remain many 
unexplored territories there. 
4.
Self-love is more cunning than the most cunning man in the world. 
5.




Passion often renders the most clever man a fool, and even sometimes renders the 
most foolish man clever. 
7.
Great and striking actions which dazzle the eyes are represented by politicians as the 
effect of great designs, instead of which they are commonly caused by the temper 
and the passions. Thus the war between Augustus and Anthony, which is set down 
to the ambition they entertained of making themselves masters of the world, was 
probably but an effect of jealousy. 
8.
The passions are the only advocates which always persuade. They are a natural art, 
the rules of which are infallible; and the simplest man with passion will be more 
persuasive than the most eloquent without. 
9.
The passions possess a certain injustice and self interest which makes it dangerous 
to follow them, and in reality we should distrust them even when they appear most 
trustworthy. 
10.
In the human heart there is a perpetual generation of passions; so that the ruin of 
one is almost always the foundation of another. 
11.
Passions often produce their contraries: avarice sometimes leads to prodigality, and 
prodigality to avarice; we are often obstinate through weakness and daring though 
timidity. 
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12.
Whatever care we take to conceal our passions under the appearances of piety and 
honour, they are always to be seen through these veils. 
14.
Men are not only prone to forget benefits and injuries; they even hate those who 
have obliged them, and cease to hate those who have injured them. The necessity of 
revenging an injury or of recompensing a benefit seems a slavery to which they are 
unwilling to submit. 
17.
The moderation of those who are happy arises from the calm which good fortune 
bestows upon their temper. 
18.
Moderation is caused by the fear of exciting the envy and contempt which those 
merit who are intoxicated with their good fortune; it is a vain display of our strength 
of mind, and in short the moderation of men at their greatest height is only a desire 
to appear greater than their fortune. 
19.
We have all sufficient strength to support the misfortunes of others. 
20.




Philosophy triumphs easily over past evils and future evils; but present evils triumph 
over it. 
25.
We need greater virtues to sustain good than evil fortune. 
27.
People are often vain of their passions, even of the worst, but envy is a passion so 
timid and shame-faced that no one ever dare avow her. 
28.
Jealousy is in a manner just and reasonable, as it tends to preserve a good which 
belongs, or which we believe belongs to us, on the other hand envy is a fury which 
cannot endure the happiness of others. 
29.
The evil that we do does not attract to us so much persecution and hatred as our 
good qualities. 
30.
We have more strength than will; and it is often merely for an excuse we say things 
are impossible. 
31.
If we had no faults we should not take so much pleasure in noting those of others. 
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32.
Jealousy lives upon doubt; and comes to an end or becomes a fury as soon as it passes 
from doubt to certainty. 
33.
Pride indemnifies itself and loses nothing even when it casts away vanity. 
34.
If we had no pride we should not complain of that of others. 
35.
Pride is much the same in all men, the only difference is the method and manner of 
showing it. 
36.
It would seem that nature, which has so wisely ordered the organs of our body for 
our happiness, has also given us pride to spare us the mortification of knowing our 
imperfections. 
37.
Pride has a larger part than goodness in our remonstrances with those who commit 
faults, and we reprove them not so much to correct as to persuade them that we 
ourselves are free from faults. 
38.
We promise according to our hopes; we perform according to our fears. 
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39.
Interest speaks all sorts of tongues and plays all sorts of characters; even that of 
disinterestedness. 
40.
Interest blinds some and makes some see. 
41.
Those who apply themselves too closely to little things often become incapable of 
great things. 
42.
We have not enough strength to follow all our reason. 
43.
A man often believes himself leader when he is led; as his mind endeavours to reach 
one goal, his heart insensibly drags him towards another. 
44.
Strength and weakness of mind are mis-named; they are really only the good or 
happy arrangement of our bodily organs. 
47.
Our temper sets a price upon every gift that we receive from fortune. 
48.
Happiness is in the taste, and not in the things themselves; we are happy from 
possessing what we like, not from possessing what others like. 
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49.
We are never so happy or so unhappy as we suppose. 
51.
Nothing should so much diminish the satisfaction which we feel with ourselves as 
seeing that we disapprove at one time of that which we approve of at another. 
54.
The contempt of riches in philosophers was only a hidden desire to avenge their 
merit upon the injustice of fortune, by despising the very goods of which fortune had 
deprived them; it was a secret to guard themselves against the degradation of 
poverty, it was a back way by which to arrive at that distinction which they could 
not gain by riches. 
55.
The hate of favourites is only a love of favour. The envy of not possessing it, consoles 
and softens its regrets by the contempt it evinces for those who possess it, and we 
refuse them our homage, not being able to detract from them what attracts that of 
the rest of the world. 
56.
To establish ourselves in the world we do everything to appear as if we were 
established. 
57.
Although men flatter themselves with their great actions, they are not so often the 
result of a great design as of chance. 
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59.
There are no accidents so unfortunate from which skilful men will not draw some 
advantage, nor so fortunate that foolish men will not turn them to their hurt. 
62.
Sincerity is an openness of heart; we find it in very few people; what we usually see is 
only an artful dissimulation to win the confidence of others. 
63.
The aversion to lying is often a hidden ambition to render our words credible and 
weighty, and to attach a religious aspect to our conversation. 
66.
A clever man ought to so regulate his interests that each will fall in due order. Our 
greediness so often troubles us, making us run after so many things at the same 
time, that while we too eagerly look after the least we miss the greatest. 
68.
It is difficult to define love; all we can say is, that in the soul it is a desire to rule, in 
the mind it is a sympathy, and in the body it is a hidden and delicate wish to possess 
what we love—Plus many mysteries. 
69.
If there is a pure love, exempt from the mixture of our other passions, it is that 
which is concealed at the bottom of the heart and of which even ourselves are 
ignorant. 
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72.
If we judge of love by the majority of its results it rather resembles hatred than 
friendship. 
75.
Neither love nor fire can subsist without perpetual motion; both cease to live so soon 
as they cease to hope, or to fear. 
78.
The love of justice is simply in the majority of men the fear of suffering injustice. 
79.
Silence is the best resolve for him who distrusts himself. 
80.
What renders us so changeable in our friendship is, that it is difficult to know the 
qualities of the soul, but easy to know those of the mind. 
81.
We can love nothing but what agrees with us, and we can only follow our taste or our 
pleasure when we prefer our friends to ourselves; nevertheless it is only by that 
preference that friendship can be true and perfect. 
82.
Reconciliation with our enemies is but a desire to better our condition, a weariness 
of war, the fear of some unlucky accident. 
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83.
What men term friendship is merely a partnership with a collection of reciprocal 
interests, and an exchange of favours—in fact it is but a trade in which self-love 
always expects to gain something. 
84.
It is more disgraceful to distrust than to be deceived by our friends. 
85.
We often persuade ourselves to love people who are more powerful than we are, yet 
interest alone produces our friendship; we do not give our hearts away for the good 
we wish to do, but for that we expect to receive. 
86.
Our distrust of another justifies his deceit. 
87.
Men would not live long in society were they not the dupes of each other. 
88.
Self-love increases or diminishes for us the good qualities of our friends, in 
proportion to the satisfaction we feel with them, and we judge of their merit by the 
manner in which they act towards us. 
90.
In the intercourse of life, we please more by our faults than by our good qualities. 
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95.
The test of extraordinary merit is to see those who envy it the most yet obliged to 
praise it. 
100.
Gallantry of mind is saying the most empty things in an agreeable manner. 
102.
The head is ever the dupe of the heart. 
103.
Those who know their minds do not necessarily know their hearts. 
108.
The head cannot long play the part of the heart. 
114.
We are inconsolable at being deceived by our enemies and betrayed by our friends, 
yet still we are often content to be thus served by ourselves. 
115.
It is as easy unwittingly to deceive oneself as to deceive others. 
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116.
Nothing is less sincere than the way of asking and giving advice. The person asking 
seems to pay deference to the opinion of his friend, while thinking in reality of 
making his friend approve his opinion and be responsible for his conduct. The 
person giving the advice returns the confidence placed in him by eager and 
disinterested zeal, in doing which he is usually guided only by his own interest or 
reputation. 
118.
The intention of never deceiving often exposes us to deception. 
119.
We become so accustomed to disguise ourselves to others that at last we are 
disguised to ourselves. 
120.
We often act treacherously more from weakness than from a fixed motive. 
121.
We frequently do good to enable us with impunity to do evil. 
122.
If we conquer our passions it is more from their weakness than from our strength. 
126.
Cunning and treachery are the offspring of incapacity. 
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127.
The true way to be deceived is to think oneself more knowing than others. 
132.
It is far easier to be wise for others than to be so for oneself. 
135.
We sometimes differ more widely from ourselves than we do from others. 
136.
There are some who never would have loved if they never had heard it spoken of. 
137.
When not prompted by vanity we say little. 
138.
A man would rather say evil of himself than say nothing. 
139.
One of the reasons that we find so few persons rational and agreeable in 
conversation is there is hardly a person who does not think more of what he wants 
to say than of his answer to what is said. The most clever and polite are content with 
only seeming attentive while we perceive in their mind and eyes that at the very 
time they are wandering from what is said and desire to return to what they want to 
say. Instead of considering that the worst way to persuade or please others is to try 
thus strongly to please ourselves, and that to listen well and to answer well are some 
of the greatest charms we can have in conversation. 
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140.
If it was not for the company of fools, a witty man would often be greatly at a loss. 
141.
We often boast that we are never bored, but yet we are so conceited that we do not 
perceive how often we bore others. 
143.
It is oftener by the estimation of our own feelings that we exaggerate the good 
qualities of others than by their merit, and when we praise them we wish to attract 
their praise. 
144.
We do not like to praise, and we never praise without a motive. Praise is flattery, 
artful, hidden, delicate, which gratifies differently him who praises and him who is 
praised. The one takes it as the reward of merit, the other bestows it to show his 
impartiality and knowledge. 
145.
We often select envenomed praise which, by a reaction upon those we praise, shows 
faults we could not have shown by other means. 
146.
Usually we only praise to be praised. 
149.
The refusal of praise is only the wish to be praised twice. 
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150.
The desire which urges us to deserve praise strengthens our good qualities, and 
praise given to wit, valour, and beauty, tends to increase them. 
155.
There are some persons who only disgust with their abilities, there are persons who 
please even with their faults. 
156.
There are persons whose only merit consists in saying and doing stupid things at the 
right time, and who ruin all if they change their manners. 
159.
It is not enough to have great qualities, we should also have the management of 
them. 
162.
The art of using moderate abilities to advantage wins praise, and often acquires 
more reputation than real brilliancy. 
164.
It is much easier to seem fitted for posts we do not fill than for those we do. 
165.
Ability wins us the esteem of the true men, luck that of the people. 
166.
The world oftener rewards the appearance of merit than merit itself. 
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168.
However deceitful hope may be, yet she carries us on pleasantly to the end of life. 
169.
Idleness and fear keeps us in the path of duty, but our virtue often gets the praise. 
173.
There are different kinds of curiosity: one springs from interest, which makes us 
desire to know everything that may be profitable to us; another from pride, which 
springs from a desire of knowing what others are ignorant of. 
182.
Vices enter into the composition of virtues as poison into that of medicines. 
Prudence collects and blends the two and renders them useful against the ills of life. 
184.
We admit our faults to repair by our sincerity the evil we have done in the opinion of 
others. 
185.
There are both heroes of evil and heroes of good. 
186.
We do not despise all who have vices, but we do despise all who have not virtues. 
187.
The name of virtue is as useful to our interest as that of vice. 
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195.
The reason which often prevents us abandoning a single vice is having so many. 
196.
We easily forget those faults which are known only to ourselves. 
197.
There are men of whom we can never believe evil without having seen it. Yet there 
are very few in whom we should be surprised to see it. 
223.
Gratitude is as the good faith of merchants: it holds commerce together; and we do 
not pay because it is just to pay debts, but because we shall thereby more easily find 
people who will lend. 
224.
All those who pay the debts of gratitude cannot thereby flatter themselves that they 
are grateful. 
225.
What makes false reckoning, as regards gratitude, is that the pride of the giver and 
the receiver cannot agree as to the value of the benefit. 
226.
Too great a hurry to discharge of an obligation is a kind of ingratitude. 
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227.
Lucky people are bad hands at correcting their faults; they always believe that they 
are right when fortune backs up their vice or folly. 
229.
The good we have received from a man should make us excuse the wrong he does us. 
231.
It is great folly to wish only to be wise. 
236.
It would seem that even self-love may be the dupe of goodness and forget itself 
when we work for others. And yet it is but taking the shortest way to arrive at its 
aim, taking usury under the pretext of giving, in fact winning everybody in a subtle 
and delicate manner. 
237.
No one should be praised for his goodness if he has not strength enough to be 
wicked. All other goodness is but too often an idleness or powerlessness of will. 
251.
There are people whose faults become them, others whose very virtues disgrace 
them. 
254.
Humility is often a feigned submission which we employ to supplant others. It is one 
of the devices of Pride to lower us to raise us; and truly pride transforms itself in a 
thousand ways, and is never so well disguised and more able to deceive than when it 
hides itself under the form of humility. 
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261.
The usual education of young people is to inspire them with a second self-love. 
262.
There is no passion wherein self-love reigns so powerfully as in love, and one is 
always more ready to sacrifice the peace of the loved one than his own. 
264.
Pity is often a reflection of our own evils in the ills of others. It is a delicate foresight 
of the troubles into which we may fall. We help others that on like occasions we may 
be helped ourselves, and these services which we render, are in reality benefits we 
confer on ourselves by anticipation. 
266.
We deceive ourselves if we believe that there are violent passions like ambition and 
love that can triumph over others. Idleness, languishing as she is, does not often fail 
in being mistress; she usurps authority over all the plans and actions of life; 
imperceptibly consuming and destroying both passions and virtues. 
267.
A quickness in believing evil without having sufficiently examined it, is the effect of 
pride and laziness. We wish to find the guilty, and we do not wish to trouble 
ourselves in examining the crime. 
269.
No man is clever enough to know all the evil he does. 
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279.
When we exaggerate the tenderness of our friends towards us, it is often less from 
gratitude than from a desire to exhibit our own merit. 
281.
Pride, which inspires, often serves to moderate envy. 
282.
Some disguised lies so resemble truth, that we should judge badly were we not 
deceived. 
293.
Moderation cannot claim the merit of opposing and overcoming Ambition: they are 
never found together. Moderation is the languor and sloth of the soul, Ambition its 
activity and heat. 
295.
It is well that we know not all our wishes. 
304.
We may forgive those who bore us, we cannot forgive those whom we bore. 
308.
Moderation is made a virtue to limit the ambition of the great; to console ordinary 
people for their small fortune and equally small ability. 
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313.
How is it that our memory is good enough to retain the least triviality that happens 
to us, and yet not good enough to recollect how often we have told it to the same 
person? 
314.
The extreme delight we take in talking of ourselves should warn us that it is not 
shared by those who listen. 
315.
What commonly hinders us from showing the recesses of our heart to our friends, is 
not the distrust we have of them, but that we have of ourselves.
319.
If we take the liberty to dwell on their faults we cannot long preserve the feelings we 
should hold towards our friends and benefactors. 
328.
Envy is more irreconcilable than hatred. 
350.
Why we hate with so much bitterness those who deceive us is because they think 
themselves more clever than we are. 
354.
There are certain defects which well mounted glitter like virtue itself. 
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355.
Sometimes we lose friends for whose loss our regret is greater than our grief, and 
others for whom our grief is greater than our regret. 
366.
However we distrust the sincerity of those whom we talk with, we always believe 
them more sincere with us than with others. 
376.
Envy is destroyed by true friendship, flirtation by true love. 
383.
The desire of talking about ourselves, and of putting our faults in the light we wish 
them to be seen, forms a great part of our sincerity. 
398.
Of all our faults that which we most readily admit is idleness: we believe that it 
makes all virtues ineffectual, and that without utterly destroying, it at least suspends 
their operation.
399.
There is a kind of greatness which does not depend upon fortune: it is a certain 
manner what distinguishes us, and which seems to destine us for great things; it is 
the value we insensibly set upon ourselves; it is by this quality that we gain the 
deference of other men, and it is this which commonly raises us more above them, 
than birth, rank, or even merit itself. 
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404.
It appears that nature has hid at the bottom of our hearts talents and abilities 
unknown to us. It is only the passions that have the power of bringing them to light, 
and sometimes give us views more true and more perfect than art could possibly do. 
409.
We should often be ashamed of our very best actions if the world only saw the 
motives which caused them. 
410.
The greatest effort of friendship is not to show our faults to a friend, but to show 
him his own. 
411.
We have few faults which are not far more excusable than the means we adopt to 
hide them. 
426.
The charm of novelty and old custom, however opposite to each other, equally blind 
us to the faults of our friends. 
427.
Most friends sicken us of friendship, most devotees of devotion. 
428.
We easily forgive in our friends those faults we do not perceive. 
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432.
To praise good actions heartily is in some measure to take part in them. 
433.
The most certain sign of being born with great qualities is to be born without envy. 
434.
When our friends have deceived us we owe them but indifference to the tokens of 
their friendship, yet for their misfortunes we always owe them pity. 
438.
There is a certain lively gratitude which not only releases us from benefits received, 
but which also, by making a return to our friends as payment, renders them 
indebted to us. 
442.
We try to make a virtue of vices we are loath to correct. 
457.
We should gain more by letting the world see what we are than by trying to seem 
what we are not. 
458.
Our enemies come nearer the truth in the opinions they form of us than we do in our 
opinion of ourselves. 
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462.
The same pride which makes us blame faults from which we believe ourselves free 
causes us to despise the good qualities we have not. 
463.
There is often more pride than goodness in our grief for our enemies' miseries; it is 
to show how superior we are to them, that we bestow on them the sign of our 
compassion. 
473.
However rare true love is, true friendship is rarer. 
476.
Our envy always lasts longer than the happiness of those we envy. 
485.
Those who have had great passions often find all their lives made miserable in being 
cured of them. 
486.
More persons exist without self-love than without envy. 
494.
What makes us see that men know their faults better than we imagine, is that they 
are never wrong when they speak of their conduct; the same self-love that usually 
blinds them enlightens them, and gives them such true views as to make them 
suppress or disguise the smallest thing that might be censured. 
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503.
Jealousy is the worst of all evils, yet the one that is least pitied by those who cause it. 
504.
Thus having treated of the hollowness of so many apparent virtues, it is but just to 
say something on the hollowness of the contempt for death. I allude to that 
contempt of death which the heathen boasted they derived from their unaided 
understanding, without the hope of a future state. There is a difference between 
meeting death with courage and despising it. The first is common enough, the last I 
think always feigned. Yet everything that could be has been written to persuade us 
that death is no evil, and the weakest of men, equally with the bravest, have given 
many noble examples on which to found such an opinion, still I do not think that any 
man of good sense has ever yet believed in it. And the pains we take to persuade 
others as well as ourselves amply show that the task is far from easy. For many 
reasons we may be disgusted with life, but for none may we despise it. Not even 
those who commit suicide regard it as a light matter, and are as much alarmed and 
startled as the rest of the world if death meets them in a different way than the one 
they have selected. The difference we observe in the courage of so great a number of 
brave men, is from meeting death in a way different from what they imagined, when 
it shows itself nearer at one time than at another. Thus it ultimately happens that 
having despised death when they were ignorant of it, they dread it when they 
become acquainted with it. If we could avoid seeing it with all its surroundings, we 
might perhaps believe that it was not the greatest of evils. The wisest and bravest 
are those who take the best means to avoid reflecting on it, as every man who sees it 
in its real light regards it as dreadful. The necessity of dying created all the 
constancy of philosophers. They thought it but right to go with a good grace when 
they could not avoid going, and being unable to prolong their lives indefinitely, 
nothing remained but to build an immortal reputation, and to save from the general 
wreck all that could be saved. To put a good face upon it, let it suffice, not to say all 
that we think to ourselves, but rely more on our nature than on our fallible reason, 
which might make us think we could approach death with indifference. The glory of 
dying with courage, the hope of being regretted, the desire to leave behind us a good 
reputation, the assurance of being enfranchised from the miseries of life and being 
no longer dependent on the wiles of fortune, are resources which should not be 
passed over. But we must not regard them as infallible. They should affect us in the 
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same proportion as a single shelter affects those who in war storm a fortress. At a 
distance they think it may afford cover, but when near they find it only a feeble 
protection. It is only deceiving ourselves to imagine that death, when near, will seem 
the same as at a distance, or that our feelings, which are merely weaknesses, are 
naturally so strong that they will not suffer in an attack of the rudest of trials. It is 
equally as absurd to try the effect of self-esteem and to think it will enable us to 
count as naught what will of necessity destroy it. And the mind in which we trust to 
find so many resources will be far too weak in the struggle to persuade us in the way 
we wish. For it is this which betrays us so frequently, and which, instead of filling us 
with contempt of death, serves but to show us all that is frightful and fearful. The 
most it can do for us is to persuade us to avert our gaze and fix it on other objects. 
Cato and Brutus each selected noble ones. A lackey sometime ago contented himself 
by dancing on the scaffold when he was about to be broken on the wheel. So however 
diverse the motives they but realize the same result. For the rest it is a fact that 
whatever difference there may be between the peer and the peasant, we have 
constantly seen both the one and the other meet death with the same composure. 
Still there is always this difference, that the contempt the peer shows for death is 
but the love of fame which hides death from his sight; in the peasant it is but the 
result of his limited vision that hides from him the extent of the evil, end leaves him 
free to reflect on other things. 
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From the First and Third Supplements
From the 1665 first edition (I), 1666 second edition (II), and posthumous 1693 edition (VI).
XIV. (I: 97)
The first impulse of joy which we feel at the happiness of our friends arises neither 
from our natural goodness nor from friendship; it is the result of self-love, which 
flatters us with being lucky in our own turn, or in reaping something from the good 
fortune of our friends. 
XV. (I: 99)
In the adversity of our best friends we always find something which is not wholly 
displeasing to us. 
XXII. (II.97)
It is a proof of little friendship not to perceive the growing coolness of that of our 
friends. 
LXXXVI. (VI)
A true friend is the greatest of all goods, and that of which we think least of 
acquiring. 
CXXIV. (VI)
Renewed friendships require more care than those that have never been broken. 
29 Reflections on Various Subjects
Reflections on Various Subjects
IV. On Society. 
In speaking of society my plan is not to speak of friendship, for, though they have 
some connection, they are yet very different. The former has more in it of greatness 
and humility, and the greatest merit of the latter is to resemble the former. 
For the present I shall speak of that particular kind of intercourse that gentlemen 
should have with each other. It would be idle to show how far society is essential to 
men: all seek for it, and all find it, but few adopt the method of making it pleasant 
and lasting. 
Everyone seeks to find his pleasure and his advantage at the expense of others. We 
prefer ourselves always to those with whom we intend to live, and they almost 
always perceive the preference. It is this which disturbs and destroys society. We 
should discover a means to hide this love of selection since it is too ingrained in us to 
be in our power to destroy. We should make our pleasure that of other persons, to 
humour, never to wound their self-love. 
The mind has a great part to do in so great a work, but it is not merely sufficient for 
us to guide it in the different courses it should hold. 
The agreement we meet between minds would not keep society together for long if 
she was not governed and sustained by good sense, temper, and by the consideration 
which ought to exist between persons who have to live together. 
It sometimes happens that persons opposite in temper and mind become united. 
They doubtless hold together for different reasons, which cannot last for long. 
Society may subsist between those who are our inferiors by birth or by personal 
qualities, but those who have these advantages should not abuse them. They should 
seldom let it be perceived that they serve to instruct others. They should let their 
conduct show that they, too, have need to be guided and led by reason, and 
accommodate themselves as far as possible to the feeling and the interests of the 
others. 
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To make society pleasant, it is essential that each should retain his freedom of 
action. A man should not see himself, or he should see himself without dependence, 
and at the same time amuse himself. He should have the power of separating himself 
without that separation bringing any change on the society. He should have the 
power to pass by one and the other, if he does not wish to expose himself to 
occasional embarrassments; and he should remember that he is often bored when he 
believes he has not the power even to bore. He should share in what he believes to be 
the amusement of persons with whom he wishes to live, but he should not always be 
liable to the trouble of providing them. 
Complaisance is essential in society, but it should have its limits, it becomes a slavery 
when it is extreme. We should so render a free consent, that in following the opinion 
of our friends they should believe that they follow ours. 
We should readily excuse our friends when their faults are born with them, and they 
are less than their good qualities. We should often avoid to show what they have 
said, and what they have left unsaid. We should try to make them perceive their 
faults, so as to give them the merit of correcting them. 
There is a kind of politeness which is necessary in the intercourse among gentlemen, 
it makes them comprehend badinage, and it keeps them from using and employing 
certain figures of speech, too rude and unrefined, which are often used thoughtlessly 
when we hold to our opinion with too much warmth. 
The intercourse of gentlemen cannot subsist without a certain kind of confidence; 
this should be equal on both sides. Each should have an appearance of sincerity and 
of discretion which never causes the fear of anything imprudent being said. 
There should be some variety in wit. Those who have only one kind of wit cannot 
please for long unless they can take different roads, and not both use the same 
talents, thus adding to the pleasure of society, and keeping the same harmony that 
different voices and different instruments should observe in music; and as it is 
detrimental to the quiet of society, that many persons should have the same 
interests, it is yet as necessary for it that their interests should not be different. 
We should anticipate what can please our friends, find out how to be useful to them 
so as to exempt them from annoyance, and when we cannot avert evils, seem to 
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participate in them, insensibly obliterate without attempting to destroy them at a 
blow, and place agreeable objects in their place, or at least such as will interest them. 
We should talk of subjects that concern them, but only so far as they like, and we 
should take great care where we draw the line. There is a species of politeness, and 
we may say a similar species of humanity, which does not enter too quickly into the 
recesses of the heart. It often takes pains to allow us to see all that our friends know, 
while they have still the advantage of not knowing to the full when we have 
penetrated the depth of the heart. 
Thus the intercourse between gentlemen at once gives them familiarity and 
furnishes them with an infinite number of subjects on which to talk freely. 
Few persons have sufficient tact and good sense fairly to appreciate many matters 
that are essential to maintain society. We desire to turn away at a certain point, but 
we do not want to be mixed up in everything, and we fear to know all kinds of truth. 
As we should stand at a certain distance to view objects, so we should also stand at a 
distance to observe society; each has its proper point of view from which it should be 
regarded. It is quite right that it should not be looked at too closely, for there is 
hardly a man who in all matters allows himself to be seen as he really is. 
V. On Conversation. 
The reason why so few persons are agreeable in conversation is that each thinks 
more of what he desires to say, than of what the others say, and that we make bad 
listeners when we want to speak. 
Yet it is necessary to listen to those who talk, we should give them the time they 
want, and let them say even senseless things; never contradict or interrupt them; on 
the contrary, we should enter into their mind and taste, illustrate their meaning, 
praise anything they say that deserves praise, and let them see we praise more from 
our choice than from agreement with them. 
To please others we should talk on subjects they like and that interest them, avoid 
disputes upon indifferent matters, seldom ask questions, and never let them see that 
we pretend to be better informed than they are. 
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We should talk in a more or less serious manner, and upon more or less abstruse 
subjects, according to the temper and understanding of the persons we talk with, 
and readily give them the advantage of deciding without obliging them to answer 
when they are not anxious to talk. 
After having in this way fulfilled the duties of politeness, we can speak our opinions 
to our listeners when we find an opportunity without a sign of presumption or 
opinionatedness. Above all things we should avoid often talking of ourselves and 
giving ourselves as an example; nothing is more tiresome than a man who quotes 
himself for everything. 
We cannot give too great study to find out the manner and the capacity of those with 
whom we talk, so as to join in the conversation of those who have more than 
ourselves without hurting by this preference the wishes or interests of others. 
Then we should modestly use all the modes abovementioned to show our thoughts to 
them, and make them, if possible, believe that we take our ideas from them. 
We should never say anything with an air of authority, nor show any superiority of 
mind. We should avoid far-fetched expressions, expressions hard or forced, and 
never let the words be grander than the matter. 
It is not wrong to retain our opinions if they are reasonable, but we should yield to 
reason, wherever she appears and from whatever side she comes, she alone should 
govern our opinions, we should follow her without opposing the opinions of others, 
and without seeming to ignore what they say. 
It is dangerous to seek to be always the leader of the conversation, and to push a 
good argument too hard, when we have found one. Civility often hides half its 
understanding, and when it meets with an opinionated man who defends the bad 
side, spares him the disgrace of giving way. 
We are sure to displease when we speak too long and too often of one subject, and 
when we try to turn the conversation upon subjects that we think more instructive 
than others, we should enter indifferently upon every subject that is agreeable to 
others, stopping where they wish, and avoiding all they do not agree with. 
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Every kind of conversation, however witty it may be, is not equally fitted for all 
clever persons; we should select what is to their taste and suitable to their condition, 
their sex, their talents, and also choose the time to say it. 
We should observe the place, the occasion, the temper in which we find the person 
who listens to us, for if there is much art in speaking to the purpose, there is no less 
in knowing when to be silent. There is an eloquent silence which serves to approve 
or to condemn, there is a silence of discretion and of respect. In a word, there is a 
tone, an air, a manner, which renders everything in conversation agreeable or 
disagreeable, refined or vulgar. 
But it is given to few persons to keep this secret well. Those who lay down rules too 
often break them, and the safest we are able to give is to listen much, to speak little, 
and to say nothing that will ever give ground for regret. 
